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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of SPYRO GERMENIS, 
-against- 
NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
nf the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Appearances: 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 0 1 -07-ST7464 Index No. 873-07 
Spyro Germenis 
Inmate No. 83-B- 1433 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Woodbourne Correctional Facility 
99 Prison Road, P.O. Box 1000 
Woodbourne, NY 12788- 1000 
Andrew M. Cuomo 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(Steven H. Schwartz, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
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The petitioner, an inmate at Woodbourne Correctional Facility, has commenced the 
instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated 
September 6, 2005 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. Petitioner is serving 
a ic'rm of fiftc.cn years to life on a conviction of murdcr sccond dcgrcc involving the dciith 
of his girlfriend. Among the many arguments set forth in the petition, the petitioner points 
out that this was his fifth appearance before the Parole Board. The petitioner attributes his 
crime to consumption of an illegal drug, lysergic acid diethyl amide (LSD). He indicates that 
he received a certificate in ministry from the New York State Theological Seminary. 
According to the petitioner, he was instrumental in establishing a ministry of the Greek 
Orthodox Church in the New York State prison system. He avers that he has completed three 
hundred hours of substance abuse therapy and aggression replacement therapy. He has been 
a facilitator for the aggression replacement therapy program. He has been a trainer and 
facilitator for the alternatives to violence program. He underwent eighty hours of training 
as inmate program associate. He was granted an outside work pass and worked in the 
administration building at Woodbourne Correctional Facility. He has received three 
superintendent's commendations. He maintains that he has had an exemplary disciplinary 
record while in prison, and that he has never been disciplined for a violent act. He has 
received a number of letters of recommendation, some from prominent members of the 
community. 
The petitioner asserts that the Parole Board relied upon incorrect information in the 
2 
[* 2 ]
pre-sentence report. He argues that the decision of the Parole Board is, in his words, “bare 
and conclusory”, and in violation of Executive Law 5 2594. In his view, the Parole Board, 
in rendering its determination, failed to articulate which factor or factors were found to be 
criticizes the Parole Board for violating his rights to equal protection and due process. 
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole 
are set forth as follows: 
“Upon a review of the record, personal interview and due 
deliberation, it is the determination of the panel that parole is 
denied. You are presently incarcerated upon your conviction of 
murder 2nd by plea, wherein you repeatedly stabbed your 
girlfriend, causing her death. You then hid her body and, days 
later, wrapped her body in plastic, attached a weight and threw 
it into the bay. It is noted that this offense is your only crime of 
conviction. The panel has considered your programming and 
disciplinary record since your last board appearance, including 
a Tier I11 and a Tier I1 infraction. Also considered are the 
documents submitted on your behalf, including numerous 
positive letters of support. Discretionary release must again be 
denied. You committed a vicious and violent crime evidencing 
a callous disregard for the sanctity of human life. Your brutal 
behavior was planned and further aggravated by your 
subsequent cover-up efforts. All factors considered, the panel 
concludes that you are a continuing risk to public safety and 
your continued incarceration is warranted. Release at this time 
would deprecate the severity of your conduct, undermine respect 
for the law and tend to trivialize the tragic loss of life which you 
caused. ” 
As stated in Executive Law $259-i (2) (c) (A): 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as 
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties 
3 
[* 3 ]
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines 
;~doplcd pursuant to subdivision four oi’ section two hundrcd 
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be 
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals 
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational 
education, training or work assignments, therapy and 
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) 
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release 
program; (iii) release plans including community resources, 
employment, education and training and support services 
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the 
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement 
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s 
representative [I” (Executive Law 52594 [2] [c] [A]). 
“Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable” (Matter of Sinopoli v New York State Board of Parole, 189 
AD2d 960,960 [3rd Dept., 19931, citing Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
157 AD2d 944). If the parole board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory 
requirements, the board’s determination is not subject to judicial review (y?g Rifik31~ v .  
Hammock, 103 AD2d 944 [3rd Dept., 19841). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality 
bordering on impropriety” on the part of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate 
judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting 
Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence 
of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination made 
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by the Parole Board (E Matter of Perez v. New York State of Division of Parole, 294 
AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021). 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
dccision and its determination was supported by the record. A wvicw of the [rmscxipt ofthe 
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such 
factors as petitioner's institutional programming, his disciplinary record, and letters 
submitted on his behalf. The Parole Board afforded the petitioner an opportunity to speak 
in favor of his release. The parole decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner 
of the reasons for the denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law 
$2594 (=Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green 
v. New York State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). It is proper, and 
in fact required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate's crime and its 
violent nature (see Matter of Weir v. New York State Division of Parole, 205 AD2d 906,907 
[3rd Dept., 19941; Maper of Sinopoli v. New York State Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, 
supra; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996). The Parole Board i 7  not 
required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it considered in determining 
the inmate's application, or to expressly discuss each one (see Matter of Farid v Travis, supra; 
Matter of Moore v New York State Bd. of Parole, 233 AD2d 653 [3rd Dept., 19961; Matter 
of Collado v New York State Division ofparole, 287 AD2d 92 1 [3rd Dept., 200 11). Nor must 
the Parole Board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence of 
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Executive Law $ 2594 (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silvero v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd 
Dept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable 
weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a 
pctilioticr is i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r ~ ~ c t - : ~ ~ t ~ ~ l ,  ;IS well as a petiLioncr’s crimirial hislur), together with the otlicr 
statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare 
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to 
undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3 
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A], other citations 
omitted). 
With regard to petitioner’s arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to 
due process, the Court observes that it has been repeatedly held that a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest does not arise under Executive Law $ 259-i, since it does not create 
an entitlement to, or legitimate expectation of release (see Barna v Travis, 239 F3d 169 [2nd 
Cir.,2001];MarvinvGoord,255 F3d40 [2”dCir., 20011, a tp .44:Paunet tc \~~IHRm.~.~k (516 
F Supp 1367 [US Dist. Ct., SD NY, 19811; Washington v White, 805 F Supp 191 [SDNY, 
19921). The Court, accordingly, finds no due process violation. 
With respect to petitioner’s equal protection argument, the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the Federal Constitution forbids States from denying to any person within their jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws, but does not prevent the States from making reasonable 
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classifications among persons (Western & S.L.I. Co. v Bd. of Equalization, 451 US 648,68 
L Ed 2d 5 14, 523 10 1 S Ct 2070 [ 198 11). Where the action under review does not involve 
a suspect class or fundamental right, it is not subject to strict judicial scrutiny, but rather is 
examined using the rational basis standard to determine if the action violated the equal 
protection clause (see, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v Murnia, 427 US 307,49 L Ed 2d 
520,524,96 S Ct 2562 and Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242,250). In this instance there is 
simply no evidence of either selective or disparate treatment or that the respondent’s 
determination was motivated by impermissible considerations (see Giordano v City of New 
York, 274 F3d 740, 75 1 [2nd Cir., 20011). 
With regard to petitioner’s argument that the Appeals Unit failed to issue a timely 
decision, the Court observes that such a failure does not operate to invalidate the underlying 
administrative decision. The sole consequence is to permit the petitioner to deem his or her 
administrative remedy to be exhausted, and enable the petitioner to immediately seek judicial 
review of the underlying determination (see 9 NYCRR 8 8006.4 [c]; Graham v New York 
-~ State Divisipn c\fPaE\e, 269 AD2d 628 [3rd Dept, 20001, lv denied 95 NY2d 753: People ex 
rel. Tyler v Travis, 269 AD2d 636 [3rd Dept., 20001). 
The record does not support petitioner’s assertion that the decision was predetermined 
consistent with an alleged executive branch policy mandating denial of parole to all violent 
felony offenders. The Court, accordingly, finds no merit to the argument (see Matter of 
Lue-Shing. v Pataki, 301 AD2d 827, 828 [3rd Dept., 20031; Matter of Perez v State of New 
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York Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Jones v Travis, 293 
AD2d 800,801 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Little v Travis, 15 AD3d 698 [3rd Dept., 20051, 
Matter of Wood v Dennison, 25 AD3d 1056 [3rd Dept., 20061). 
rI’l~ei-c is 110 requirement that the deliberations of the l’arole Board be recorded (see 
Executive 2594 [ 6 ] ;  Matter of Collins v Hammock, 96 AD2d 733 [4th Dept., 19831). 
With respect to petitioner’s arguments concerning alleged erroneous information in 
the presentence report, It is well settled that “a defendant is not permitted to collaterally 
attack a presentence report” (see Matter of Cox v New York State Division of Parole, 11 
AD3d 766,767-768 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Matter of Salerno v Murphy, 292 AD2d 837, 
837-838 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 607 [2002], and citing Matter of Sciaraffo v New York 
City Dept. of Probation, 248 AD2d 477,477 [ 19981). For this reason, the Court finds that 
petitioner’s arguments concerning alleged errors in the presentence report are of no merit. 
The Parole Boardls decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 months) 
is within the Board‘s discretion and was supported by the record (see Matter of Tatta v State 
ofNew Yqrk-Tj~isjnn PfParqk. 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 3_0)0’?], B Y  denied QRMY?d 604). 
The Court has reviewed petitioner’s remaining arguments and finds them to be without 
merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
petition must therefore be dismissed. 
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Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. All papers are 
xturnecl to thc. attorney for the respondent who is directed to enter this 
Decision/Order/Judgment without notice and to serve petitioner with a copy of this 
DecisiodOrder with notice of entry. 
Dated: 
ENTER 
June z, 2007 
Troy, New York 
I 
Supreme Court Justice 
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